

15 JUN 1982

NOTE FOR: [REDACTED] 25X1  
Special Assistant to the DCI for Interdepartmental Affairs

FROM: [REDACTED] 25X1  
Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence

SUBJECT: Proposal for Topic to be Raised by DCI/DDCI with  
Sec Def/Dep Sec Def

The following topic is proposed for the DCI's consideration in preparation for his and Mr. McMahon's meeting with Secretary Weinberger and Deputy Secretary Carlucci on Friday, 18 June at 0745:

Soviet Interest in Crisis Management Center

Attached are: a) talking points, [REDACTED] 25X1  
[REDACTED] c) a State cable from Moscow 25X1  
containing the particulars of the Soviet initiative, d) a copy of  
the Nunn-Jackson amendment, and e) the original proposal as it  
appeared in the Post on 12 November 1981.

Attachment:  
As Stated

cc: DDI  
EO/NIC

State Dept. review completed

Soviet Interest in Crisis Management Center  
(DCI/DDCI Meeting with Sec Def/Dep Sec Def - 18 June 1982)

Talking Points

- As reported in our Daily, an influential Soviet strategic analyst has suggested that summit discussions could include nonproliferation and a mechanism for bilateral cooperation on nuclear conflicts involving third countries.
- The analyst (V. F. Davydov) was acting on instructions in speaking to a US Embassy official. He requested an authoritative reaction.
- The analyst mentioned the Senate amendment (Nunn-Jackson) to the US Defense Authorization Bill calling for, inter alia, a bilateral mechanism for crisis coordination.
- The amendment provides for a multinational center to be established by the US and USSR for crisis management during any nuclear confrontation, a bilateral forum for sharing information on nuclear weapons acquired by Third World countries and terrorist groups, and improvements to the US-Soviet hotline for crisis control.
- It calls for the Secretary of Defense to conduct a "full and complete study" of its provisions.
- We are now evaluating a proposal from an outside contractor  to analyze Soviet interest in the crisis management center as part of a broader assessment of Soviet nonproliferation policies and attitudes.
- We stand ready to participate in any study that might eventually be undertaken given the importance of intelligence in such arrangements as a crisis management center.

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 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4994  
 INFO RUHNA/USMISSION USNATO 1782  
 RUHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5932  
 RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 8951  
 BT  
 C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 06169

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E.O. 12065: TDS-2 5/22/02 (MCCALL, SHERROD) DR-P  
 TAGS: MNUC, PARM  
 SUBJECT: USA INSTITUTE ANALYST PROPOSES ARMS CONTROL  
 - TOPICS FOR REAGAN-BREZHNEV SUMMIT

REF: A) FBIS USSR 26 APR 82, B) MOSCOW 4888,  
 - C) MOSCOW 5169

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT).  
 2. SUMMARY: A USA INSTITUTE ANALYST HAS ASKED FOR OUR VIEWS ON TWO QUESTIONS WHICH HE SUGGESTS THAT REAGAN AND BREZHNEV MIGHT DISCUSS AT A SUMMIT:  
1) OPPORTUNITIES FOR JOINT US-SOVIET ACTIONS ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, AND 2) THE CREATION OF A MECHANISM FOR COORDINATION ON NUCLEAR CONFLICTS INVOLVING THIRD POWERS, ALONG THE LINES OF THE "JACKSON-NUNN" PROPOSAL. THE ANALYST CLAIMS THAT THE MAIN FOCUS OF SOVIET CONCERN IS THE "NEW NUCLEAR POWERS NEAR THE USSR," ISRAEL AND PAKISTAN. REGARDING THE FIRST QUESTION, THE ANALYST APPEARS TO BE REITERATING SOVIET INTEREST IN FURTHER CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN NUCLEAR EXPORTING STATES. THE ANALYST'S SECOND QUESTION REVEALS AN INTEREST IN USING THE PROPOSED NUNN AMENDMENT TO RESUSCITATE A PROPOSAL ADVANCED BY THE USSR TEN YEARS AGO BUT REJECTED BY THE U.S. IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT LED TO THE 1973 US-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR. THE ANALYST SUGGESTED THAT THE USSR MIGHT BE WILLING TO SUPPORT THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR A MIDDLE EAST NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE, AND PERHAPS A SIMILAR PROPOSAL FOR SOUTH ASIA. EMBASSY REQUESTS WASHINGTON'S GUIDANCE ON WHAT RESPONSE, IF ANY, SHOULD BE MADE. END SUMMARY.

3. ON MAY 17 THE USA INSTITUTE GAVE EMBOFF A LONG-REQUESTED APPOINTMENT WITH STRATEGIC ANALYST

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VALERIY F. DAVYDOV. THE MEETING WAS FOR THE NEXT DAY, WHEN BREZHNEV WAS ADDRESSING THE KOMSOMOL CONGRESS. DAVYDOV OPENED THE MEETING BY READING TWO QUESTIONS FROM A PREPARED TEXT:

-- DOES THE U. S. SEE ANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR JOINT US-SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION? WHAT CONCRETE MEASURES COULD BE UNDERTAKEN?  
-- WHAT IS THE U.S. VIEW OF THE PROPOSAL BY SENATORS "JACKSON AND NUNN" FOR THE CREATION OF A JOINT US-SOVIET MECHANISM FOR COORDINATION OF NUCLEAR CONFLICTS INVOLVING THIRD POWERS?

4. DAVYDOV SAID THAT "PERHAPS THESE PROBLEMS COULD BE A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN PRESIDENTS BREZHNEV AND REAGAN AT A SUMMIT."

5. DAVYDOV ASKED EMBOFF FOR HIS VIEWS. EMBOFF BEGGED OFF BY SAYING THAT HE WAS NOT AT THE MOMENT ABLE TO RESPOND AUTHORITATIVELY. HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT FIRST. DAVYDOV THEN LAUNCHED INTO AN APPARENT BACKGROUND EXPLANATION ON WHY HE WAS ASKING THE QUESTIONS. DAVYDOV'S MAIN POINTS WERE:

-- THE FALKLANDS CRISIS ILLUSTRATES THE NECESSITY OF KNOWING EXACTLY WHAT NUCLEAR POTENTIALS ARE OF THIRD COUNTRIES, IN ORDER TO PREVENT NUCLEAR CONFLICTS AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF GREAT POWERS.

-- WE MUST DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR POTENTIALS IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO TAKE CONCRETE ACTIONS.

-- AS FOR THE SOVIET UNION, THERE ARE ESSENTIAL NONPROLIFERATION QUESTIONS NEAR ITS BORDERS. THE MIDDLE EAST IS AN ESPECIALLY SERIOUS PROBLEM AND SO IS INDIA-PAKISTAN.

-- WE KNOW THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN IS NOT GOING TO RECONVENE THE LONDON SUPPLIERS GROUP, ALTHOUGH THERE IS CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR THIS STEP. FOR EXAMPLE, SENATOR HART AND CONGRESSMAN OTTINGER, WHO HAVE PROPOSED A RESOLUTION TO LIMIT THE TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, FAVOR THIS APPROACH. THUS WE CANNOT EXCLUDE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN MAY DO SOMETHING.

-- IS PRESIDENT REAGAN, IN HIS APPROACH TO STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS, DIRECTED BY THE CONCEPT OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION THAT NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND NONPROLIFERATION ARE LINKED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 6 OF THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY(NPT)?

-- THE PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT ARE NOT JUST THOSE OF THE U.S. AND THE USSR, BUT OF OTHER STATES, ESPECIALLY THE ISSUE OF NONPROLIFERATION. SOONER

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OR LATER THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION MAY TAKE THE POSITION OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION ON NON-PROLIFERATION.

-- IT IS A PITY THE 1980 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE DID NOT END SUCCESSFULLY.

-- THE AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR DOES NOT CONTAIN ENOUGH FROM A PRACTICAL POINT OF VIEW.

-- WE MUST HAVE DISCUSSIONS TO DEAL WITH THIRD COUNTRIES. (EMBOFF ASKED IF DAVYDOV WAS THINKING OF CHINA; DAVYDOV SAID THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON NEW NUCLEAR POWERS.)

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-- MAYBE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE READY TO SUPPORT THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR A MIDDLE EAST NUCLEAR FREE ZONE. MAYBE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD TAKE THE SAME POSITION TOWARD SOUTH ASIA. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE U.S. IS PAYING TOO LITTLE ATTENTION THERE.

-- MAYBE IT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE THESE ISSUES A PRIORITY PROBLEM FOR OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE OTTINGER PROPOSAL CONCERNS ONLY TECHNOLOGY, BUT THE "JACKSON-NUNN PROPOSAL" IS BETTER BECAUSE IT CONCERNS JOINT ACTIONS ON NUCLEAR CONFLICTS INVOLVING THIRD COUNTRIES.

7. COMMENT: DAVYDOV'S PRESENTATION SEEMS TO BE AN EFFORT TO FLOAT TRIAL BALLOONS. THIS MAY BE AT THE INSTITUTE'S INITIATIVE, OR IT MAY HAVE A HIGHER-LEVEL IMPRIMATUR. WE CANNOT BE SURE.

8. IN RAISING HIS FIRST QUESTION DAVYDOV SEEMS TO BE ASKING WHAT IDEAS THE U.S. MAY HAVE IN MIND REGARDING FUTURE MECHANISMS FOR NUCLEAR SUPPLIER CONSULTATIONS.

9. IN PUTTING HIS SECOND QUESTION DAVYDOV APPEARS TO BE ASKING WHETHER THE U.S. MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THE 1973 AGREEMENT TO PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR, PERHAPS ALONG THE LINES OF THE PROPOSED NUNN AMENDMENT WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH A CRISIS CENTER FOR MONITORING AND CONTAINING NUCLEAR WEAPONS USED BY THIRD PARTIES.

10. DAVYDOV'S EMPHASIS ON "COORDINATION" WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR CONFLICTS INVOLVING THIRD POWERS IS REMINISCENT OF DOBRYNIN'S MAY 1972 PROPOSAL TO KISSINGER THAT THE U.S. AND THE USSR "SHALL PREVENT" SITUATIONS WHEREBY ACTIONS OF THIRD COUNTRIES MIGHT PRODUCE A NUCLEAR WAR. DOBRYNIN'S PROPOSAL WAS REJECTED, IN PART BECAUSE OF ITS CONDOMINIUM AND ANTI-CHINESE IMPLICATIONS, ALTHOUGH SUBSEQUENT US-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS LED TO THE 1973 AGREEMENT.

11. DAVYDOV PUBLISHED A LONG, POLEMICAL ARTICLE IN KRASNAYA ZVEZDA APRIL 20 CRITICAL OF THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMS AND INTENTIONS OF PAKISTAN, ISRAEL, AND SOUTH AFRICA, AND OF ALLEGED U.S. CONNECTIONS WITH THESE STATES (REF A). ALTHOUGH IN THE ARTICLE DAVYDOV PUT EMPHASIS ON SOUTH AFRICA AS WELL AS PAKISTAN AND ISRAEL, DAVYDOV'S PRIVATE REMARKS MAKE IT CLEAR THAT MOSCOW'S REAL WORRY IS CLOSER TO HOME, THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA.

## ACTION REQUESTED:

12. DAVYDOV APPEARS TO EXPECT A RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTIONS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON'S GUIDANCE ON WHAT, IF ANY, RESPONSE SHOULD BE MADE.

HARTMAN

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

May 13, 1982

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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

(1) A detailed evaluation of the study's findings, conclusions, and recommendations;

(2) The views of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau on the "Vista 1999" study;

(3) Any plans and recommendations for implementation of the contents of the "Vista 1999" study.

(b) This report shall be provided to the Committees on Armed Services of the House and Senate no later than February 1, 1983.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment would require a study by the Secretary of Defense of the recent report of the "Vista 1999" task force which was a group of senior Army and Air National Guard adjutants generals, general officers, and commanders. These individuals took a long term, no-holds-barred look at the scope, size, nature, and methods of operations for what they considered the appropriate ways for the Army and Air National Guard to fulfill their constitutional and statutory responsibilities for the security of the Nation through the year 1999.

In its report entitled "Vista 1999, A Long-Range Look at the Future of the Army and Air National Guard," the task force made a number of findings and recommendations which bear serious review.

I am offering an amendment which will require a high-level focus by the Secretary of Defense on this substantive and provocative report. The amendment will require a study and evaluation by the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau with a report to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on their views.

Congressman NEWT GINGRICH has introduced a similar amendment on the House side and in fact brought this amendment to my attention. I commend him for this leadership in this effort and am pleased to offer a companion, although not identical, amendment in the Senate side.

I hope the chairman and the ranking minority member will accept this amendment.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator enlighten me a little further on what the objective of the study is?

Mr. NUNN. To require high-level focus in the Department of Defense on a very important study into the Army and Air National Guard, which really affects the whole posture of the Guard for the next 20 years.

As the chairman knows, many times what the Guard recommends is ignored, and this would require high-level focus and reaction by the Secretary of Defense on what is a very substantive report.

Mr. TOWER. Does this have to do with the Guard's equipment?

Mr. NUNN. The whole gamut of the Guard's role—tactics, mission. It is a whole look at what the Guard's position is in the national security picture.

Mr. TOWER. This is the Guard and the Reserve?

Mr. NUNN. This is primarily the Guard. It addresses some Reserve issues but is primarily the Guard.

Mr. TOWER. Is it something to the effect of how they fit into the total force concept?

Mr. NUNN. That is right, and what role they should be playing in the future. It makes some thought provoking suggestions. I believe it should be looked at very high up in the Defense Department.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I should like to support the amendment.

Mr. TOWER. If my distinguished friend from Mississippi is prepared to support it, I can hardly do otherwise. I am prepared to accept the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment (UP No. 954) was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question occurs on the amendment of the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment of the Senator from Oregon be temporarily laid aside; that the Senator from Georgia may offer an amendment; that upon the disposition of the amendment of the Senator from Georgia, the Senate return to the considerations of the amendment of the Senator from Oregon.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## UP AMENDMENT NO. 955

(Purpose: An amendment to evaluate arms control initiatives to include military crisis control center and hotline enhancements.)

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Georgia (Mr. NUNN), for himself, Mr. WARNER, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. DURENBERGER, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. BURDICK, and Mr. CHILES, proposes an unprinted amendment numbered 955.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the end of the bill add the following section:

Sec. (a) The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a full and complete study and evaluation of initiatives for improving the containment and control of the use of nuclear weapons, particularly in crises. Such study and evaluation shall include but not be limited to the following initiatives:

(1) establishment of a multi-national military crises control center for monitoring and containing nuclear weapons used by third parties or terrorist groups;

(2) development of a forum for joint U.S./U.S.S.R. sharing of information on nuclear weapons that could be used by third parties or terrorist groups; and

(3) development of U.S./U.S.S.R. confidence-building measures for crisis stability and arms control to include:

(A) an improved U.S./U.S.S.R. communications hotline for crisis control;

(B) enhanced verification procedures for any arms control agreements;

(C) measures to reduce vulnerability of command, control and communications on both sides; and

(D) measures to lengthen the warning time each nation would have of potential nuclear attack.

(a) this report shall be provided to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the House and Senate by August 1, 1982 and should be available in both a classified, if necessary, and unclassified format.

(b) the President shall report to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations one month later on September 1, 1982 on the merits of such initiatives developed in section (a) to the arms control process and on the status of any such initiative as they may relate to any arms control negotiation with the Soviet Union.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I am sponsoring this amendment and the cosponsors are Senators WARNER, JACKSON, DURENBERGER, MITCHELL, CRANSTON, BURDICK, and CHILES.

Mr. President, in all of the current focus on nuclear freezes, "no first use" and arms control policies in general, there is an extremely important element missing—the need to deal constructively with the prospect of a nuclear war triggered by a third country or terrorist group. No change in NATO's nuclear doctrine and none of the freeze proposals would decrease or prevent the chances of such a catastrophe. An accidental nuclear war or war by miscalculation should be of mutual concern to the two superpowers.

I have been concerned about the potential of an accidental nuclear exchange between the two superpowers for some time. On March 10, 1981, I wrote the Commander of the Strategic Air Command, Gen. Richard Ellis, and asked SAC, as the premier defense command in nuclear matters, to analyze the potential for this type of exchange and to recommend some initiatives for dealing with the problem. General Ellis is now retired and serving as the U.S. representative on the Standing Consultative Committee and is one of the most thorough and knowledgeable military men in the arms control area as well as an expert in nuclear policies and weapons.

I outlined my belief that our strategic arms control efforts have for sometime concentrated almost exclusively on the number of launchers and warheads and the "bolt from the blue" premeditated strategic strike. While I certainly agree with the importance of this focus and these negotiations, I feel that we should also begin to think seriously about what could be more likely catalysts which could lead to nuclear war. There are many factors that need assessment as to how the U.S./U.S.S.R. would interact at the strategic level in times of crises and conflict.

For example, a disguised third country attack on one of the superpowers could precipitate a United States/Soviet nuclear exchange.

I asked General Ellis to examine four key areas in his study as follows:

First. Is our communications, command, and control capable of discerning the source of attack under this type scenario?

Second. What capabilities do the Soviets have in this respect (warning and threat assessment)?

Third. What other scenarios should be considered in terms of U.S./U.S.S.R. strategic interaction in periods of crises and conflict?

Fourth. Are there arms control innovations and initiatives that can be proposed in this general area as well as the overall C-3/connectivity area?

General Ellis established a study group that spent many months working on these issues, and in July of that same year I went to SAC in Omaha to discuss the results of their study.

Mr. President, I believe that their conclusions are even more relevant today, and I hope that the members of both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee at some point will be briefed on this classified information.

In brief, in an unclassified way, the SAC analysis showed that the United States and the Soviets must dramatically improve their warning and attack characterization to deal with the use of a nuclear device by a third party in either peacetime or a crisis situation.

To be able to detect the origin of a nuclear attack is all important for the superpowers, both superpowers, if we are going to avoid and hopefully prevent that kind of situation from developing.

The SAC analysis dealt with the potential third party threat by examining the various unconventional delivery systems that could be utilized to explode such a device on United States or Soviet soil.

SAC also identified many unconventional methods of delivery other than the normally discussed platforms such as fighter planes, missiles or bombers that a Third World nation might utilize.

Mr. President, by the end of the decade over 20 nations will have the industrial capability to build nuclear weapons, and the possibility of possession of these weapons by terrorists cannot be dismissed.

Mr. President, I am convinced that both the United States and Russia have a common and mutual interest in preventing such a Third World trigger or a terrorist use of nuclear weapons. I am convinced that both nations have a mutual interest in working together to identify the source of a nuclear strike from a third country or from a terrorist attack. I am convinced that arms control efforts can be made relevant to the growing danger of this type of a nuclear catalyst.

Everyone now seems to be in search of an easy solution in the arms control area, but there are no nuclear quick fixes. What we can begin to do jointly with the Soviet Union is to build a capability and mutual trust to reduce the likelihood of accidental nuclear war or war by miscalculation. This step could add a strong element of deterrence to any party contemplating the use of nuclear weapons for the purpose of provoking a confrontation between the superpowers.

For this reason, Mr. President, I am proposing this amendment to the fiscal year 1983 defense authorization bill directing the Secretary of Defense to conduct a full and complete study of initiatives for improving the containment and control of the use of nuclear weapons including:

First, establishment of a multinational military crisis control center for monitoring and containing nuclear weapons used by third parties or terrorist groups;

Second, development of a forum for joint U.S./U.S.S.R. sharing of information on nuclear weapons that could be used by third parties or terrorist groups; and

Third, development of U.S./U.S.S.R. confidence-building measures for crisis stability and arms control to include:

An improved U.S./U.S.S.R. communications hotline for crisis control;

Enhanced verification procedures for any arms control agreements;

Measures to reduce vulnerability of command, control, and communications on both sides; and

Measures to lengthen the warning time each nation would have of potential nuclear attack.

This study and report would be provided to the Congress by August 1, 1982, and I would further require that the President review the results of the DOD analysis and submit to the Congress within a month his views on the merits of the proposals and their relevance to U.S. arms control policies and proposals.

Mr. President, I believe this amendment will provide a sound analytical framework for the key agencies in our Government and the public to deal with the issue of accidental nuclear war. There has been very little work done in this area other than the pioneer study by SAC under General Ellis' direction.

This amendment will also serve to focus attention on this important element of the nuclear issue which is missing in the current debate and discussion and which is a more likely contingency, in my view, than a premeditated nuclear attack or "bolt out of the blue."

Mr. President, I hope that this amendment will be acceptable to the Senate.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, after discussing the matter with the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, I have arrived at the conclusion that it is a good amendment, and I am pre-

pared to accept it on behalf of the majority.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I think it has good possibilities, also, and we will have a better chance before conference and at conference to really consider it than we do here this morning.

So I hope we take it.

Mr. NUNN. I thank the chairman and the ranking minority member.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Georgia.

The amendment (UP No. 955) was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question recurs on the amendment of the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment of the Senator from Oregon be temporarily laid aside to permit the Senator from Michigan to offer an amendment and on the disposition of the amendment of the Senator from Michigan return to the consideration of the amendment of the Senator from Oregon.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### UP AMENDMENT NO. 956

(Purpose: To establish a procedure for increased legislative oversight of increases in costs of acquisition of certain major defense systems)

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Michigan (Mr. LEVIN), for himself, Mrs. KASSEBAUM, and Mr. EAGLETON, proposes an unprinted amendment numbered 956.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the end of the bill add the following new section:

#### ANALYSIS OF REPORTS ON UNIT COSTS OF MAJOR DEFENSE SYSTEMS

Sec. (a) At the same time that the Secretary concerned transmits to the Congress any report under section 1103(b)(3) of this Act or any certification under section 1103(c)(2)(b) of this Act, the Secretary concerned shall transmit a copy of such report or certification to the Comptroller General of the United States (hereafter in this section referred to as the "Comptroller General").

(b)(1) Not later than 45 days after the date on which the Secretary concerned transmits under subsection (a) a copy of any report or certification referred to in such subsection, the Comptroller General shall review and analyze such report or certification and transmit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a written report on such review and analysis. Where applicable, the report by the Comptroller General shall include his opinion on—



# Arms Control: What We Should Do

America's arms control goals have been vague and poorly understood by the public. Our tactics have been short-term, and our strategy ambiguous. Our patience at the negotiating table has been short-lived. Our timing has too often been driven by election considerations and our expectations have swung between euphoria and despair.

Three arms control treaties with the Soviet Union have been signed (by presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter) but have not been ratified by the Senate. This may demonstrate that our "separation of powers" is alive and well, but it also raises serious questions as to whether any American president can conclude an arms control treaty any more.

## The Setting

The United States is now abiding (without formal agreement) by a SALT treaty that President Reagan himself declared "fatally flawed." While awaiting leverage from newly announced but as yet unapproved strategic programs, we are not renegotiating this unratified treaty. Testimony indicates it will be at least the late 1980s before any new strategic programs close the "window of vulnerability" and bring us back to "parity." Several key parts of the recently announced strategic program, which are not yet well-defined, will have major arms control implications.

We are about to begin negotiations with the Soviets on tactical nuclear weapons, an area in which the United States has little leverage and NATO is at a pronounced military disadvantage. These negotiations provide the Soviet Union a considerable opportunity to prevent the long overdue NATO tactical nuclear force modernization. They also create an increasingly unrealistic separation between strategic and theater nuclear weapons and allow the Soviets skillfully to manipulate growing European skepticism of American leadership.

Under these circumstances, should we be puzzled when we look over our shoulder and our allies aren't following our lead? They don't know where we're going. Do we? Whether we like it or not, our arms control efforts and NATO's future are now linked. A clear, consistent arms control approach that enjoys the support of Congress and the American people is a national security imperative.

## Continuity

If the American position on arms control is to have more credibility with our allies, our adversaries and the American people, we must bring some continuity to our process for formulating and executing arms control policy and integrating it with military policies. We must develop a clear set of long-term

*"For more than a decade, the Soviets have had essentially the same people negotiating SALT. During that same period, the United States has had six chief negotiators and the major support staff has been changed many times."*

goals, objectives and priorities that can be understood by the public, our allies and, ideally, even our adversaries.

Procedures within our government must be developed to ensure that strategic weapons programs and arms control measures mesh together better. We can no longer separate the two functions, giving civilians the job of controlling arms and the military the job of procuring weapons. U.S. military planners must have a greater input in shaping our arms control objectives so that arms control measures can also be treated as viable instruments for attaining required security objectives.

For more than a decade, the Soviets have had essentially the same people negotiating SALT. During that same period, the United States has had six chief negotiators and the major support staff has been changed many times. Why shouldn't the Soviets be confident they can wait out the Americans? Why shouldn't our allies and our adversaries believe that our patience and our horizons are limited in the arms control arena?

One way to improve arms control continuity would be to upgrade substantially the current General Advisory Committee on Arms Control. The present committee is co-located with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and, rightly or wrongly, is viewed as an adjunct of that agency. We should consider creating a bipartisan presidential commission to be the board of directors for our arms control efforts.

The commission would be appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate for overlapping terms long enough to give it independence and continuity. It could not and should not supersede the constitutional prerogatives of the executive branch to negotiate, and the Senate to ratify, treaties. It could, however, be asked to bring some coherence to our arms control philosophy and implementation. Reporting directly to the president, the board should have a broad charter to consider arms control under the rubric of overall national security and foreign policy.

It could provide a publicly respected review board to:

- Help formulate long- and short-term

arms control objectives, goals and priorities consistent with our national security and our defense policies;

- Monitor negotiations; and
- Keep the American public informed of the goals, objectives and priorities of our arms control efforts in a way that can be separated from partisan political considerations.


## Stability

The U.S. arms control process has had a narrow scope that undermines its potential positive impact in military terms and in international opinion. Over the last decade, most of our arms control effort has been directed at limiting the size of nuclear arsenals rather than avoiding or limiting the potential use of nuclear weapons in crises—so-called "crisis-stability." We hope to reduce the number of weapons in the long run, but reductions in numbers do not automatically or necessarily increase crisis stability. We hope to save money with a sound arms control agreement, but an even larger strategic budget would be well worth the money if the result were the reduced likelihood of nuclear war. With thousands of nuclear warheads available to each side, control of their use in crises is more important than reduction of numbers, cost or technological development.

We must begin to think about arms control initiatives that will address crisis stability.

How would the Russians react if a low-flying aircraft with U.S. markings delivered a nuclear device on one of their cities? Do they have the capability to determine the true origin of the aircraft? Would stunned and angry Russians react calmly and cautiously or would they draw immediate conclusions and launch a nuclear attack against America? How would we react if a nuclear device exploded in a ship of unknown origin in San Francisco harbor and obliterated the city? Will we sit idly by while the possibilities grow in the years ahead that a fanatical leader may attempt to rid the world of the superpowers by pulling a Third World trigger?

Are these unreal science fiction fantasies or is there a growing possibility of a third-party or terrorist use of nuclear weapons? At my request last spring, Gen. Richard Ellis, then



Commander of the Strategic Air Command, undertook the evaluation of the possibility of a third party triggering a superpower nuclear exchange under a variety of scenarios. Unfortunately, this evaluation showed that there are real and developing dangers in this area.

Do the U.S.S.R. and the United States have a mutual interest in preventing a Third World trigger or a terrorist use of nuclear weapons? Should both nations have a mutual interest in working together to be able immediately to identify the source of a nuclear strike from a third country or from a terrorist attack? Can arms control efforts be made relevant to the growing dangers of this type of nuclear catalyst?

The point is not to frighten, but to stimulate the best minds in both the United States and the Soviet Union to think soberly about the future potential for destruction facing the world. There are an increasing number of scenarios that could precipitate the outbreak of nuclear war that neither side anticipated or intended. By 1990, our government believes that more than 20 nations may have the industrial capability to build nuclear weapons. Terrorist possession of nuclear warheads in the future cannot be dismissed. Several nations are now also developing rockets for "commercial purposes." The simple fact is that we really don't have an international framework or mechanism for quickly and decisively controlling or containing these possibilities. In a world growing more dangerous with proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as other nuclear powers, have growing reason to work together to prevent nuclear war.

### U.S.-Soviet Cooperation

While there is still time, serious thought should be given by ourselves and the Russians to our possible mutual interest in establishing a military crisis control center for the monitoring and containment of nuclear weapons used by third parties or terrorist groups. This could take the form of joint U.S.-Soviet information-sharing combined with a multinational center for crisis management. A precedent for this type of effort can be found in the four-power Berlin center for movement of aircraft in the Berlin corridors.

The crisis management group could be a permanent standing team of highly qualified civilian and military personnel, in full operation 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, with access to the top political and military leadership. Its purpose would be to provide a mechanism that gives each side more confidence in the facts during a nuclear crisis. It would afford the leaders of both nations a better chance to determine, independently and jointly, the origin and parties responsible for any explosion of nuclear weapons. It has the potential for encouraging cooperation and building confidence between the superpowers, even when political relations are at a low ebb. These steps could contribute to crisis stability. They could also add a significant degree of deterrence to third-country or terrorist attempts to light the nuclear bonfire.

This will not be a simple task completed quickly, but the discussions and negotiations should begin. These negotiations could be broadened to address other mutual arms control steps; such as confidence-building measures to enhance verification, strengthening the U.S.-Soviet hot line, as well as reducing

the vulnerabilities of command, control and communications of both nations. We could also begin discussions on a possible nuclear weapons deployment agreement that would lengthen the warning time both nations would have of a nuclear attack.

The nuclear powers must begin to improve our capacity to control a nuclear crisis—regardless of origin. Our nation must adopt clear goals that establish a foundation for arms control that has long-term continuity and less vulnerability to domestic partisan politics. We must find an arms control policy we can live with.